Flow earnings in a laboratory experiment decline the further a Brownian state variable, z, evolves from its optimal level z * . Optimal state dependent models predict subjects will pay a fixed cost to return z to z * only when z strays outside a critical inaction region around the optimum. Subjects' average adjustment points are remarkably close to optimal levels, but as in the field they do not establish true "state dependent" inaction regions, suggesting significant "time dependent" components in adjustment rules. Structural estimates of the parameters of a bounded rationality model suggest subjects experience substantial cognitive costs from responding to the state, accounting for these patterns. Cross treatment results suggest that these costs -and the resulting degree of state dependence in adjustment -are powerfully influenced by the volatility of the stochastic process, a finding with potentially important policy implications.
Introduction
When the world changes, firms must change with it to continue optimizing. But when it is costly to make changes, it pays to be judicious about timing. Indeed, Ss models show that when the future is uncertain and adjustment is costly, it is best to ignore minor deviations from optimality and delay re-optimizing until failing to do is sufficiently costly. Such decision problems are canonical, arising throughout economics. Indeed, Ss models have become a workhorse in the field in the last three decades, helping economists understand sticky prices, inventory dynamics, cash flows, hiring and firing decisions, and investments. 1 Ss models point out that agents should choose when to re-optimize soley based on the state of the world ("state dependent" adjustment) and not on any direct function of time itself ("time dependent" adjustment).
Do people use optimal state dependent rules when making adjustments? Among the best studied Ss-type problems empirically is firms' timing of price changes in the face of "menu costs." A central ambition of the empirical literature on price adjustment is to discern whether firms tend to employ the sorts of state dependent price changes predicted in Ss models or whether they instead employ "time dependent" rules of the sort described by Taylor (1980) or Calvo (1983) , a question of critical importance to monetary policy. 2 Although state dependent models are empirically successful in several dimensions, much of the evidence so far suggests that they fail to describe the data in important ways: firms also show some evidence of time dependence in their actual decision making. 3 To illustrate, Figure 1 plots log price adjustments using AC Nielsen data (the data were constructed 1 As summarized in Caplin and Leahy (2010) , the development of Ss models grew out of an interest in understanding how to manage inventories. Arrow et al. (1951) showed that Ss policies are cost minimizing in infinite horizon inventory problems while Scarf (1959) demonstrated that optimal decisions in a large class of such inventory problems take an Ss form. Given the pervasiveness of both uncertainty and fixed costs of adjustment in economics, Ss models have since been deployed in a wide range of applications in economics including the interaction of portfolio choice and housing demand (Grossman and Laroque (1990) ), the demand for durables (Bertola and Caballero (1990) ), portfolio choice and stock ownership (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) ), investment (Abel and Eberly (1994) ), the decision of countries to exit the Euro (Alvarez and Dixit (2013) ) and price adjustment (Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) ).
2 As we discuss in more detail in section 5, while monetary policy has sizable real effects when agents behave in a time dependent manner, monetary policy can be largely (or even entirely) ineffective with state dependent agents (a fact first highlighted by Caplin and Spulber (1987) ).
3 Indeed, the recent empirical literature has produced mixed support for both pure state and time dependent models. While Midrigan (2010) finds significant evidence of selection effects in firms' price changing decisions, consistent with state dependence, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find evidence of seasonality in price changes and no evidence for the upward sloping hazard functions of price adjustment that are predicted by standard state dependent models. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) find that purely state dependent models are unable to generate as many small and large price changes as are observed in the data. On the other hand, they also find that the correlation between the time between adjustments and the size of adjustments is weaker than would be expected from a purely time dependent model. Figure 1: Histogram of AC Nielsen data of log price adjustment data were constructed by Midrigan (2008) and used as an empirical benchmark in Costain and Nakov (2011a,b) .
in Midrigan (2008) and used as an empirical benchmark in Costain and Nakov (2011a,b) ). As in state dependent models, adjustments are bimodal with modes above and below zero. However, as in time dependent models the sizes of price adjustments are diffuse and not tightly clustered around modes; adjustment data provides little evidence that firms establish the inaction regions predicted by Ss models. 4
There are two broad classes of explanations available for the predictive failures of Ss models. One class is institutional: the environments studied in the field may include institutional features that rationalize time dependence but are not included in the structure of simple Ss models. 5 Another is cognitive: the models have the description of the decision problem right but limits in cognitive 4 Of course underlying parameters of the economy and institutional features of the decision task are unobservable in naturally occurring data such as this, making it difficult to make direct and easily interpretable comparisons to theoretical models. This observability problem is a central motive for conducting direct tests using controlled and sterile experiments as a complement to conventional empirics.
5 In order to explain the empirical distribution of price changes, "second-generation" state dependent pricing models have been developed that rationalize the empirical evidence by including additional institutional details in the model. Some of these competing explanations are: variable menu costs as in Dotsey et al. (1999) , infrequent shocks under small menu costs as in Gertler and Leahy (2008) and economies of scope for changing the prices of multiple products as in Midrigan (2011) and Alvarez and Lippi (2012) . For a survey of the literature see Klenow and Malin (2010) . capacity or attention prevent firms from fully assessing or responding to the current state. 6 Such boundedly rational agents' adjustment rules include properties of time dependent models that can generate patterns like those in Figure 1 .
Because the underlying decision problem faced by firms is only imperfectly observed in naturally occurring data, it is difficult to directly judge between these two classes of explanations using conventional empirics. In this paper we use laboratory experiments to help shed some new light on this question. Experiments have, for our purposes, one important advantage over the field: they give the analyst perfect information regarding and perfect control over the exact decision problem faced by subjects. If we precisely implement the simple environment of a standard Ss pricing model in the controlled and sterile setting of the lab and observe deviations in behavior matching the distinctive ones observed in the field, the cause can only be bounded rationality; alternative explanations are unavailable in our laboratory environment.
In our experiment, subjects are shown a graphical visualization of their static price and are also shown the evolution of the optimal relative price which fluctuates according to a geometric Brownian motion. The further the optimal price strays from the current price (either above or below), the lower their flow earnings. A subject's only decision is when to pay a fixed cost to adjust her price to the current optimum. Ss theory gives us clear predictions: subjects should set thresholds above and below the optimum, exercising their option to adjust only when the relative price passes one of these thresholds. Because we have access to the exact parameters of the game, we can precisely evaluate the theory's predictive power and compare it to time dependent alternatives -something that cannot be done using naturally occurring data.
Our first contribution is to show that subjects' adjustment patterns in the experiment match those observed in the field strikingly well. As in the field, adjustments in our data are bimodal, conforming with the two sided adjustment rules predicted by the theory. Moreover, because we have access to the induced parameters of the economy we are able to show, for the first time, that these adjustment points are, on average, nearly identical to those predicted in Ss models and obey 6 Woodford (2008) builds a model based on the concept of rational inattention (costly information gathering) developed by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 Sims ( , 2006 where the standard Ss model is generated as a limiting case of no information costs. More recently Costain and Nakov (2011a,b) develop a similar theory of smoothly state dependent pricing that assumes agents face cognitive costs in processing and using information to make optimal decisions. Finally, Alvarez et al. (2011) show that costly information processing (of a sort modeled in Caballero (1989), Reis (2006) and Alvarez et al. (2012a) ) in menu cost Ss model can also generate an optimal blend of time and state dependent behavior.
Ss predicted comparative statics to a remarkable degree. However, as in the field, adjustments are extremely diffuse: subjects often make price adjustments far from optimal threshold points and do not establish true inaction regions. Subjects therefore show strong evidence of the same sort of time dependence measured in the field, though here only bounded rationality seems to be a plausible explanation.
Our second contribution is to use the unique precision of laboratory data to structurally estimate cognitive costs using a model of bounded rationality similar to ones recently proposed in the literature (Woodford (2008) , Costain and Nakov (2011a,b) ). Laboratory data gives us access to all of the relevant parameters of the game and therefore allows us to precisely evaluate the degree to which subjects deviate from optimal adjustment rules. Because of this, we can collect unusually credible structural estimates of the cognitive costs of implementing state dependent decision rules for each subject in our sample. 7 Maximum likelihood estimates suggest that sizable cognitive costs are widespread in our sample and lead to significant time dependence in the average subject's adjustment decisions.
Our final contribution is to use experimental treatment variation to study whether these cognitive costs are exogenous as is often implicitly assumed in the literature or if they are, instead, influenced by other fundamentals of the economy. We focus attention on volatility, a variable of recent interest in the Ss empirical literature. As in Bloom et al. (2007) , we find that an increase in volatility reduces subjects' responsiveness to shocks in the environment. 8 Bloom et al. (2007) explain this result using standard Ss comparative statics: increased volatility widens the predicted inaction region, reducing average sensitivity to shocks in the cross section. 9 Because we can calculate exact optima in the lab, we are able to assess this explanation directly. Though we confirm that volatility does change average adjustment thresholds (almost exactly to the degree predicted), we also show that volatility has an important second effect not predicted by the orthodox model: volatility directly decreases the degree of state dependence in adjustment behavior, further reducing 7 Alvarez et al. (2012b) comes closest to our paper on this by directly estimating costs of observation of the state variable in an investment problem using a novel household survey dataset. While the mechanism they study is related to ours, the estimate is from a very different setting than firms' pricing decisions.
8 Bloom et al. (2007) investigate aggregate investment dynamics instead of price dynamics but the structure of the Ss problem they study is closely related.
9 When optimal inactivity bands widen, as they do when volatility and uncertainty rise, the likelihood of a shock pushing each firm over an optimal adjustment threshold falls. Thus, standard Ss reasoning suggests that firms in higher volatility environments should, on average, be less responsive to shocks.
individuals' sensitivity to shocks. To confirm, we run an additional diagnostic treatment in which the predicted effect of higher volatility is fully offset by a simultaneous increase in the fixed cost of adjustment, keeping the inaction region identical to the baseline treatment. Even after controlling for optimal adjustment rules in this way, subjects still show a lower responsiveness to shocks, confirming that factors not captured in orthodox models contribute to the effect of volatility on adjustment behavior. Structural estimates reveal that cognitive costs are (i) much larger in high volatility than in low volatility treatments and (ii) are similar across our two high volatility treatments. Volatility therefore directly (and robustly) increases the cost of optimizing and decreases the degree of state dependence in our data.
This final result suggests that cognitive costs are powerfully shaped by the economic environment and cannot be treated as invariant to other parameters of the economy. We argue in our concluding discussion that this finding has both methodological and policy implications. Methodologically, it suggests that caution must be taken in conducting counterfactual exercises using cognitive cost estimates, especially without attending to their dependence on environmental variables like volatility. Policy-wise, it suggests a potentially severe behavioral cost to volatility: volatility influences agents' ability to optimize. This has potential implications for understanding the effects of monetary policy shocks on the economy and contributes to a growing literature on the effects of uncertainty on macroeconomic processes.
Although our experiment uses a price adjustment setting, our findings have a broader scope: costly adjustment against uncertain fundamentals arises throughout economics. As a result, our findings shed light on an important general component of economic decision making. Indeed, given the importance of Ss models in economics, it is surprising that (to the best of our knowledge) no previous experimental studies have examined behavior in these common settings. The closest study to ours is perhaps Oprea et al. (2009) which studies how subjects learn to value real options in a related dynamic-stochastic environment, though the economic forces studied in that paper are quite different. 10 More distantly related are several experiments that study pricing frictions in macroeconomic-inspired settings. Davis and Korenok (2011) study a multi player market in which 10 In Oprea et al. (2009) , subjects choose when to make a one-time fixed investment in a project whose value evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion with positive drift. The reward function, action space and predictions are very different from those in the Ss models studied here. Moreover, while Oprea et al. (2009) is focused on understanding learning rules driving aggregate long-run time series, ours is focused on understanding cross sectional bounded rationality and time dependent departures from threshold adjustment rules.
agents are directly induced to use time dependent pricing rules and examines how these timing friction effect the speed of price convergence over a number of trading periods. Wilson (1998) studies the behavior of a monopolist facing nominal price shocks and shows that even when faced with menu costs, prices converge quickly to monopolistic levels in dynamic settings. Finally, Noussair et al. (2013) implement a multi-agent DSGE economy and show that menu cost treatments reduce the variability of inflation relative to other treatments. None of these papers, however, studies an Ss-type setting and none study the contrast between state and time dependence that animates our study. Duffy (2008) provides a comprehensive overview of the experimental macroeconomics literature.
Our paper also relates to a broader literature on bounded rationality and cognitive costs, usefully surveyed in Conlisk (1996) , who note that "deliberation about an economic decision is a costly activity, and good economics requires that we entertain all costs." A recent example by Caplin et al. (2011) develops and experimentally tests a model of satisficing where cognitive fixed costs shape sequential search over a choice set. They find that these costs increase with complexity, a result that seems related to our finding that volatility increases such costs in Ss decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe a simple Ss model inspired by the menu cost literature and compare its predictions to time dependent models and hybrid bounded rationality models recently studied in the literature. In section 3, we discuss our strategy for implementing the model in the lab and motivate our experimental design. In section 4, we present our results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion in section 5. Theoretical details and instructions to subjects are collected in Online Appendices.
Theoretical Model, Ss Predictions and Bounded Rationality
In this section we discuss the standard Ss pricing model that we take to the lab, and compare its optimal state dependent predictions to time dependent and boundedly rational alternatives. Section 2.1 describes optimal state dependent predictions for a textbook version of a standard, continuous time Ss pricing model as described by Stokey (2008) (these environments were first studied by Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) 
Model and State Dependent Optima
Consider a firm that produces a single good at a unit cost c over an infinite time horizon with profits discounted at rate r. The firm's price relative to the market price index, z(t) ≡ p(t) P (t) , 11 exogenously evolves according to the following geometric Brownian motion: 12
generating flow profits equal to
given a demand parameter θ. 13
The firm's task, at each moment in time, is to decide whether to exert control over its relative price by discontinuously adjusting it to the optimal level z * . The firm faces a fixed cost of m for each such adjustment and thus faces a sequence of optimal stopping problems: to choose the 11 p(t) is the firm's own price and P (t) is the aggregate price index. The entire problem can be described entirely in terms of relative price, z(t), because the profit function is homogeneous of degree one in both p(t) and P (t) and profits can be written entirely in terms of relative price. By reducing variables in this way, we will considerably simplify the problem for experimental subjects and focus the design on the central issue of state versus time dependence in adjustment.
12 The exogenous motion of the firm's relative price is driven by underlying Brownian evolution of the aggregate price index which follows the process
with drift µ, volatility σ and standard Wiener process w(t). Equation 2 converts the process to relative price space through a straightforward application of Ito's lemma. 13 The firm is assumed to face a standard Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz demand function
where θ is the elasticity of substitution across differentiated product varieties. Flow profits in the underlying model are
optimal times, {T i }, to adjust relative prices to the optimal level, z * , to maximize its value:
The optimal solution to this problem is to establish an "inactivity band" for z(t), (z,z): whenever z(t) lies within the inactivity band the firm makes no adjustment and whenever z(t) reaches or crosses these bounds, the firm pays m to adjust z(t) to z * . Note that this optimal decision rule is unrelated to calendar time: switches are entirely dictated by the current state of the world, z(t). In contrast to "time dependent" rules discussed in the literature (i.e. Calvo (1983) or Taylor (1980) ), the optimal rule is purely "state dependent."
Inside the inaction region the value function is characterized by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and outside the inaction region it is equal to the value at the optimal return point net of the menu cost. Thus the value of the firm over the entire state space is defined by:
Using these value functions, we can calculate the optimal bands (and the optimal adjustment point z * ) numerically using standard methods that exploit optimal return, value matching, and smooth pasting conditions (full details are provided in Online Appendix A.1).
Our experimental design, described below, will leverage two comparative static predictions made by the model. First, an increase in volatility (an increase in σ) widens the optimal inaction band (z,z). Second, an increase in the cost of adjustment, m, narrows the optimal band. See Stokey (2008) for a fuller discussion of the comparative statics of the model.
State Dependence, Time Dependence and Bounded Rationality
What alternative decision rules might agents use in the setting of the model described in the previous section? Consider the following simple descriptive framework: agents set a probability λ of adjusting to z * at each moment and can condition this λ on the current state z if they choose.
The optimal solution described in the previous section has a sharp prediction in this framework: agents will set λ = 0 when z is in the inactivity band (z,z) and λ = 1 upon reaching thresholds z orz. This is a strongly state dependent prediction as adjustment is entirely governed by (and is perfectly responsive to) the current value of z(t). Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots a histogram of the distribution of switching points from a simulation populated by purely state dependent agents. 14 A vertical dotted red line marks z * and solid red lines mark the boundariesz and z. The observable pattern generated by this decision rule is clear: we will observe adjustments nearz and z but very little adjustment away from these boundaries. 15 By contrast, classical time dependent models (ala Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) ) predict that subjects will adjust based on calendar time rather than state. The Calvo model in particular predicts that agents will simply set λ =λ (for some fixedλ) at each date, ignoring the state, z, Figure 2 shows a histogram from a simulation usingλ = 0.02. Unlike the state dependent behavior in panel (a), the distribution is strongly unimodal in state and quite diffuse, with adjustments occurring at many different relative prices. In the setting described in the previous section, such time dependent rules constitutes a substantial deviation from profit 14 The simulation (and others in this section) uses a discretization of the model parameterized by the vector (α, σ, r, m, θ, c) = (0.5, 0.0268, 0.0012, 5, 5, 0.4) (the same parameters we use in our BASE treatment in the experiment). All simulations in this section use the discretized binomial approximation we use in the experiment, described in section 3.1 below.
15 Because of the discretization, adjustments sometimes occur just beyond the predicted thresholds.
maximization.
What could cause agents to make time dependent instead of optimal state dependent decisions?
One hypothesis recently advanced in the literature is that subjects may experience costs from implementing decision rules that require complex thought about and attention to state. While a time dependent rule requires virtually no thought to implement, conditioning adjustment on the state can require considerable attention and calculation. This is true in a specific and measurable sense: the state dependent rule is a very low entropy rule, incorporating a great deal of information encoded in the state, while the time dependent rule features very high entropy, containing no information about the state at all. As Woodford (2008) and Costain and Nakov (2011a,b) point out, if the additional cognition necessary to account for state when adjusting is subjectively costly, agents may avoid using purely state dependent rules for economically sensible reasons.
To model this idea, suppose agents experience a psychic cost from implementing a decision rule that deviates in terms of relative entropy from the very simple Calvo rule. While using a mechanical
Calvo rule generates no psychic costs, switching to a different adjustment probability (as the state changes) causes such costs to rise proportionally to the change in entropy. We measure the change in entropy caused by state dependence by calculating the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the Calvo benchmark (λ) and the rule actually utilized by the agent (λ). The model is parameterized by a marginal cognitive cost κ. 16
This cost of accounting for state can be added to the standard problem in a straightforward way. When an agent chooses to adjust to z * , she still gets her expected discounted value at z * (net of the menu cost, m),
, where v(·) is the value function 17 . However, she also suffers the cost of control just described if she accounts for the state at all in her decisions. Adding in the remaining ingredients -the instantaneous profit flow, g(z), and the capital gain-like term
-the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the problem becomes:
16 The idea that decision control produces a disutility proportional to the reduction in relative entropy of choices follows Stahl (1990) and Mattsson and Weibull (2002) . This type of assumption provides the microfoundations for many static models of probabilistic choice with important empirical applications, such as quantal response equilibrium ( McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) ). For a recent and related application of this assumption, see Costain and Nakov (2013) who model near-rational retail price adjustments and study its macroeconomic implications.
17 Note that this model treats z * as parametric, matching the experimental design in which subjects automatically move to z * when adjusting.
where the reduction in relative entropy achieved by decision rule λ is given by:
It is then straightforward to show that the optimal choice of the adjustment probability, λ, is given by:
This expression reveals that purely state and time dependent rules are special cases of this model, governed by the cost, κ, of responding to the current state. When κ is zero, and cognition is costless, λ = 1 and the agent is capable of precisely adjusting as a function of state as visualized in Figure 2 (a). In the limit, when κ is infinite, the agent ignores the state, setting a fixed λ =λ and implementing the Calvo rule pictured in Figure 2 (b).
At intermediate values of κ, agents will display a hybrid pattern between these two extremes.
Panel ( 18 Simulations use the discretization described in Online Appendix A.5. 19 The major difference between the simulation shown in Figure 2 (c) and the field data plotted in Figure 1 is that Figure 2 (c) features asymmetric concentrations around the two modes: the left hand mode is much taller than the right hand mode. This is a straightforward consequence of the specific parameters used in the simulations (and in the experiment). Briefly, becausez is considerably closer to z * than is z in this parameterization, agents adjust back to z * much more often below z * than above, creating a much larger concentration of upward adjustments in price than downward adjustments and generating the asymmetric modes observed in the figure (this asymmetry can also variables (and even the form of the decision problem itself) are generally unobservable in naturally occurring data, making it difficult to directly evaluate such explanations for time dependence. Do decision makers avoid setting purely state dependent adjustment rules even when we know they are acting in a standard Ss environment? Is bounded rationality sufficient to generate the sorts of time dependent patterns observed in the field? In order to directly answer such questions, we turn to the controlled setting of a laboratory experiment.
Experimental Implementation and Treatment Design
In this section we describe our strategy for taking the model described in section 2.1 to the laboratory. In section 3.1, we show how we convert the continuous time, infinite horizon model into a closely related near-continuous time, indefinite horizon game. In section 3.2, we describe the visual software we built to test the theory and provide details regarding the implementation of the experiment. Finally, in section 3.3, we describe and motivate our experimental treatments.
Binomial Conversion
There are two barriers to directly implementing the model described in section 2.1 in the laboratory. First, true Brownian motion evolves in infinitesimal time increments and cannot therefore be generated in simulation. Second, the model has an infinite horizon and experimental sessions are obviously of finite duration.
To cope with the first problem, we turn to a well known binomial approximation standardly used to simulate Brownian motion. We divide the game into a number of ticks, each of length ∆t.
In each tick, the series P (t) iterates up with probability p and down with probability 1 − p. If the tick moves up, it rises to (1 + h)P (t) for a step size parameter h and, if down, to (1 − h)P (t).
As ∆t approaches zero, the parameters converge to the two key Brownian parameters, drift
be seen in 2 (a)). A different choice of parameters would generate symmetric modes (or asymmetries in the opposite direction) in both the state dependent and bounded rationality models.
and volatility
Thus, by setting a very low value of ∆t (1/5 of a second in our experiment), we can generate random series that are nearly continuous and closely mimic the Brownian motion described in the theory. See Dixit (1993) for details.
To deal with the second problem, we implement a per-tick probability q of the game ending in lieu of a discount rate. As shown in Oprea et al. (2009) , this converts to the Brownian discount rate in the limit according to the following formula.
Appendix A.3 presents evidence that our choice of ∆t is small enough to generate optima in the binomial approximation that are virtually identical to those predicted in the continuous version of the model.
Implementation
We implemented the experiment using a custom piece of software programmed in a new Javascript environment called Redwood. The subject display, shown in Figure 3 , consists of three panels, each visualizing a different part of the decision problem.
First, on the top panel, we show subjects subjects their current price, p(t) and the optimal price z * P (t) (labeled the "Ideal price" on the screen). Subjects see p(t) as a stable blue line and z * P (t) as a point fluctuating over time with previous values drawn as a trailing yellow line. This slight change of framing relative to the theoretical discussion above has no effect on the theoretical predictions but makes the problem considerably easier to explain to subjects.
The bottom two panels display detailed information on the real time earnings consequences of subjects' decisions. The middle panel shows subjects their flow profits. Positive flows are shown as regions shaded in green, negative flows as regions shaded in pink. The bottom line charts the total profits accumulated so far. Table 1 : Parameter values and theoretical predictions for each treatment. In all treatments, the time step in minutes is ∆t = 0.0033.
A subject's only decision is when to press a button labeled "Move Current Price." When this button is pressed, the blue line immediately jumps to join the current Ideal price, maximizing instantaneous earnings, and a cost of m is incurred. The experiment is divided into a sixteen periods (each period is a complete play of an indefinitely repeated game), with the current period ending with a fixed probability, q, in each tick. When the period ends, a red vertical line is shown on the screen and p(t) is automatically and costlessly moved to z * P (t). By pressing the space bar, the subject begins the new period, restarting the evolution of the Ideal price.
Data was collected in the LEEPS laboratory at the University of California, Santa Cruz from April to December 2012. A total of 64 subjects were drawn from an undergraduate subject pool using students from across the curriculum, recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner (2004) ).
Subjects were randomly assigned to visually isolated terminals and interacted with no other subjects during the session. Instructions, reproduced in Online Appendix B , were read aloud prior to the beginning of the experiment. Subjects were told the exact binomial parameters used in the experiment and were given a graph showing how flow profits are impacted by deviations from z * .
Of course, they were not told optimal threshold points (or even that a threshold rule is optimal). Each period's length was randomly pre-drawn prior to data collection such that all subjects experienced identical period lengths (though of course subjects did not know the duration of any
given period until the period ended). Subjects were paid a $5 showup fee and $0.02 for each point of profit earned from one randomly selected period. Sessions lasted roughly 1 hour and 30 minutes including instructions and average subject earnings were $13.60. approximate Brownian values, other parameters used in the experiment, and both the thresholds of the optimal inactivity bands (z,z) and the optimal price ratio, z * for each treatment. Our design focuses on two main treatments (BASE and VOL) and one diagnostic treatment (CORR).
Treatments and Motivation
Each subject was observed under only one treatment (we employed a completely between-subjects design). The treatments were parameterized to achieve several inferential goals.
First, in order to give us sufficient data on adjustments both above and below z * (critical for fully assessing the predictions of the model) we focused the design on a non-inflationary setting.
The probability that relative prices rise and fall were set to p = 0.5 generating a drift in the price index of α = 0. This means prices will stray below the optimum as often as it strays above, allowing us to evaluate the organizing power of both optimal switching points,z and z, on behavior. The ability to observe adjustments on both sides of z * is also important for structural estimation because the flow payoff function is highly asymmetric. 20
Second, we carefully selected our parameters to minimize flat payoffs around the optimum, a perennial concern in implementing dynamic stochastic problems in the lab. We considered dozens of parameterizations before selecting the ones we, in the end, took to the lab to ensure that subjects face substantial costs by deviating from optimal decisions. Payoff hills from the parameterizations we selected are shown in Online Appendix A.
Third, we used parameterizations that feature asymmetric switching points below and above z * in all of our treatments: z is substantially closer in each case to z * than isz. This feature of the design allows us an additional distinctive theoretical prediction to test: state dependence should cause subjects to adjust sooner and more often below z * than above.
Fourth, while the central aim of the experiment is simply to assess the degree of state dependence that arises in a controlled setting, we also wanted to study how the degree of state dependence is influenced by the economic environment. We chose to focus the treatment design on volatility, a variable of recent interest in the Ss empirical literature (e.g. Bloom et al. (2007)). Volatility is interesting both because it has a subtle predicted comparative static effect in orthodox models but also because it is a variable with a plausible influence on time dependence-generating bounded rationality. In the high volatility (VOL) treatment we nearly doubled the value of σ relative to the baseline treatment (BASE). This is predicted, in the standard model, to reduce the sensitivity 20 While for z < z * the payoff function is steep and large deviations can easily produce losses, for z > z * the payoff function is less steep and tends to flatten out above zero. Thus observing subjects' behavior on both sides of z * allows us to obtain a more powerful estimate of the relation between the value of adjusting at a given state and the adjustment probability. This relation is central to the structural cognitive cost model estimated in Section 4.2.
of adjustment decisions to shocks in relative prices in a straightforward way: as shown in Table 1, increasing volatility expands the size of the optimal inactivity band (z,z).
Fifth, in order to better understand the effects of volatility observed in the VOL treatment, we added a diagnostic treatment called CORR (volatility, corrected) that features the same high volatility as the VOL treatment, but has the exact same optimal inactivity band as the BASE treatment. 21 By comparing CORR to BASE, we can examine the effects of volatility in an environment where standard Ss reasoning predicts no effect on behavior.
Results
We present the results in three parts. Section 4.1 presents reduced form evidence on switching behavior in our main BASE and VOL treatments. We show that while average decisions are meaningfully organized by and responsive to the underlying economic environment (suggesting state dependence), subjects do not choose sharp switching points or set true inaction regions (suggesting time dependence). Reduced form estimates of the adjustment hazard function confirm significant time dependence in our data and suggest that this time dependence is substantially higher in the VOL than in the BASE treatment. The results show that subjects experiences substantial cognitive costs from responding to the state when timing their adjustments. These costs are estimated to be, on average, three times larger than the monetary switching costs induced in the BASE treatment; in the higher volatility VOL treatment average cognitive costs rise by over 50% to 5 times the induced switching cost.
Finally, in section 4.3 we report the results of a robustness treatment, CORR, that features identical volatility to the VOL treatment but identical Ss predictions to the BASE treatment. We show that both reduced form estimates of time dependence and structural estimates of bounded rationality are statistically indistinguishable from those in the VOL treatment but significantly higher than in the BASE treatment, confirming that volatility has a meaningful and fairly stable impact on time dependence. In all of our analysis, we focus on behavior from the last half of the session (after tick 6000).
Thus all behavior analyzed in this section features subjects with considerable experience with the decision making environment. Results are qualitatively similar (though noisier) if we instead use the full sample. Figure 4 shows histograms of the state, z(t), at adjustment across subjects for each of our two main treatments. 22 For reference, vertical red dotted lines show z * while vertical solid lines show optimal switching points z andz. Several observations are worth making.
Reduced Form Results
First, the distributions of adjustment points are bimodal, with modes close to optimal switching points in each case. Second, and relatedly, the modes are substantially further apart in the VOL treatment than in the BASE treatment, as predicted by the Ss model. Third, as predicted by the Ss model in our parameterization, the modes to the left of z * are considerably higher than to the right: subjects adjust sooner and more often to price decreases than to price increases.
Fourth, and most importantly for our research questions, switching points are not tightly clus-22 These histograms are weighted so each subject makes an equal contribution to the plot. Without such weighting, subjects with extreme time dependence will tend to be significantly overweighted in the histogram, giving an unrepresentative portrait of the data. tered around the optimal thresholds but are instead quite diffuse, with a relatively large share of adjustments occurring far from optimal levels; there is little evidence that subjects establish true inaction regions as predicted by the Ss model. These often sizable deviations are a sign of time dependence, suggesting that subjects are using other (possibly random) factors than the state to trigger adjustment. Indeed, the histograms look strikingly like both the patterns generated by the bounded rationality model, pictured in panel (c) of Figure 2 , and the field evidence plotted in Figure 1 .
Finally, adjustments are significantly less tightly clustered around the mode (and the optima, particularlyz) in the VOL treatment than the BASE treatment, suggesting that the degree of state dependence is significantly impacted by the volatility of the underlying economy.
Together, these observations give us a first result:
Result 1 Adjustment distributions are bimodal but diffuse with many switches occurring far from modal levels, closely resembling evidence from the field.
Although our main interest in the data is the degree of state dependence governing subjects' decisions, it is useful to note that subjects' behavior appears to be responsive to the economic environment in a meaningful way -their decisions are far from random. Figure 4 shows adjustments clustered (though very diffusely) around modes located near optimal switch points. To study this more formally, we calculate the median adjustment state for each subject (i) conditional on adjusting below z * and (ii) conditional on adjusting above z * .
Below z * the median adjustment state (across subject-wise medians) is 0.417 in BASE and 0.402 in VOL, strikingly close to the predictions (z) of 0.41 and 0.39. Even more striking, above z * , the median adjustment is 0.662 in BASE and 0.795 in VOL, nearly identical to the predictions (z) of 0.68 and 0.80. Finally, Mann-Whitney tests confirms that median adjustments are significantly higher above z * in VOL than BASE (p < 0.001) and significantly lower below z * (p = 0.01), supporting the key comparative static prediction of the Ss model for our design.
The data thus suggests that subject behavior is, on average, quite responsive to the economic forces in the model. There is little evidence of systematic bias relative to the optimum and strong evidence that an important and subtle comparative static prediction organizes cross-treatment behavior. This finding gives us a second result: Result 2 Average switching behavior is not biased relative to optimal state dependent benchmarks, and on average, obeys comparative static predictions.
Although there is little evidence of systematic bias in switching behavior, Figure 4 shows that subjects do not adjust tightly around thresholds as a state dependent model would suggest. Our motivating hypothesis is that this lack of tightness is due to subjects failing to use consistent switching points (and failing to establish inaction regions) because of time dependence in their adjustment rules. However another possibility is a simple aggregation problem: subjects tend to employ different switching points and this generates apparent variation in adjustments when decisions are aggregated.
In order to sort out whether our results are due to time dependence or aggregation issues, we estimate the parameters of the following simple reduced form hazard function for each subject in our sample.
wherez ≡ ln z z * . Here α is a simple shifter of the hazard function (essentially an intercept term) while β measures the slope of the hazard function, a simple measure of time dependence. Under the hypothesis of perfect state dependence, this parameter will be close to zero while a large β suggests insensitivity to state, indicating time dependence. We estimate 15 by maximum likelihood for each subject independently and plot CDFs of the critical parameter β for each treatment in panel (a) of Figure 5 .
Two observations are important. First, values of β are far from zero in each treatment for most subjects, suggesting that hazard functions are flat relative to a state dependent threshold rule for individual subjects. Most individual subjects, therefore, exhibit considerable time dependence in their decision making: the diffuse adjustment pattern observed in 4 are not an artefact of aggregation of heterogeneous subject decisions. Second, values of β tend to be far higher in the VOL treatment than in the BASE treatment. Indeed, the median VOL subject's β is roughly double that of the median BASE subject and this difference is highly significant (p < 0.001, Figure 4 : volatility significantly increases time dependence in subjects' decision making.
Wilcoxon test). Estimates thus confirm the pattern observed in
Result 3 Hazard functions are gradually sloped across the sample in both treatments, evincing significant time dependence in most subjects' decision making. This time dependence roughly doubles when we increase volatility in the underlying economy.
Structural Results
Subjects show evidence of time dependence in their decision making, generating patterns that resemble those generated by the bounded rationality model discussed in section 2.2. In order to better interpret our results, we structurally estimate the parameters of that model for each subject in our dataset. Our primary interest is to recover estimates of κ, subjects' cognitive costs of implementing state dependent rules. Online Appendix A.5 discretizes the model for purposes of estimation.
Our sample consists of a set of observations {(z t , δ t ), t = 1, ..., T }, for each subject, where z t is the relative price at t and δ t is a dummy variable defined as follows:
1 if there is an adjustment at t 0 if there is no adjustment at t
Thus the hazard function can be defined as Λ(z;λ, κ), the implicit function that assigns to each state z the adjustment probability computed using equation (32) and the optimal value function obtained from the Bellman equation (33). We estimate the parametersλ, κ of the hazard function Λ(z;λ, κ) by maximum likelihood:
We plot the distribution of κ estimates across subjects for each treatment in Figure 5 . Estimates in each case are bounded away from zero, indicating significant costs of optimizing. As with our reduced form time dependence measure, β, the distributions of κ differ substantially across treatment; at 5.84, the median κ in the VOL treatment is over 50% larger than the median of 3.84 estimated in the BASE treatment. A Wilcoxon test allows us to reject the hypothesis that κ estimates are equal in BASE and VOL subjects (p = 0.015). Costs of optimizing are thus economically and statistically significantly higher in the high volatility treatment.
How should we interpret the magnitude of these estimated cognitive costs? The parameter κ is the marginal cost of deviating from a purely time dependent rule, measured in payoff units per nat (a unit of entropy). As such, the scale of κ is not very intuitive. However, our model can be used to produce a more meaningful description of average cognitive costs.
The cognitive cost of deviating from a purely time dependent ruleλ by choosing to adjust with probability λ is equal to κ · D KL (λ,λ). The median estimate ofλ is very small at 0.019, 23 meaning the average subject incurs a considerable cognitive costs when he wants to put a high probability on adjusting at a specific state. In order to adjust with probability λ = 1 (i.e. to follow a perfectly state dependent rule), the agent thus incurs the following cost:
Intuitively, Ω(κ) is the cost the agent must incur in order to guarantee an adjustment when desired (or to avoid any "slip of the hand" in her decision to adjust at any point in time). That is, it measures the additional costs for a boundedly rational agent to follow a state dependent Ss rule Result 4 Structural cognitive costs are estimated to be sizable, generating a fixed cost of action equivalent to three times the menu cost on average in the BASE treatment. These costs are highly sensitive to volatility: increasing volatility in the VOL treatment raises cognitive costs to almost five times the menu cost.
Robustness: The CORR treatment
Results so far suggest that time dependence (and cognitive costs) are heavily influenced by volatility in the price index. However, volatility has simultaneous predicted effects on behavior, stemming from orthodox Ss forces. In order to get a cleaner view of the relationship between volatility and time dependence, we designed a robustness treatment called CORR (Volatility, Corrected). In this treatment, volatility levels are identical to those in the VOL treatment but we compensate for its effect by lowering m, eliminating the effect of volatility on optimal thresholds relative to the BASE treatment. Under the hypothesis that volatility itself directly influences time dependence, we expect measures of time dependence in CORR to resemble those in VOL but to be substantially higher than in BASE.
Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows a histogram of adjustment states in the CORR treatment, with optima plotted as solid lines. The treatment generates a pattern similar to those in the BASE and VOL treatments: adjustments are bimodal and peaked near optimal levels. However, relative to the BASE treatment CORR switch points are quite diffuse, with many more adjustments clumped inside the predicted inactivity band and a much longer tail above z * .
Does the increase in volatility in the CORR treatment lead to an increase in time dependence in individual subjects relative to BASE? To find out we estimate the reduced form hazard function (15) Moreover the effect of volatility on time dependence is quite stable.
We next estimate our structural model on the CORR data and plot a CDF of the cognitive cost parameter, κ, across subjects alongside estimates from BASE and VOL. Cognitive costs increase substantially relative to the BASE treatment (p = 0.026) but are indistinguishable from those in the VOL treatment (p = 0.862). The data thus also suggest that the effect of volatility on cognitive costs is relatively stable and robust, even when volatility has no impact on optimal behavior. Finally, using κ estimates, we find that the median subject would have to expend cognitive costs of Ω CORR = 22 on top of the actual menu cost to use a purely state dependent rule. This figure is identical to the Ω VOL = 22 estimated in the VOL treatment and, again, considerably larger than the Ω BASE = 15 estimated for the BASE treatment. We conclude that Result 5 Time dependence and estimated cognitive costs in the CORR treatment are similar to those measured in the VOL treatment but considerably larger than in the BASE treatment. This suggests that the effect of volatility on time dependence is relatively stable and is independent of the effects of volatility on theoretical predictions.
Discussion
As Caplin and Leahy (2010) point out, Ss models have become a "touchstone" of economics, used to explain phenomena ranging from investment dynamics to sticky pricing, hiring decisions to inventory problems. However the predictive and explanatory power of these models is difficult to fully evaluate using conventional empirics. Perhaps the best developed empirical Ss literature so far focuses on price adjustment in the face of menu costs (e.g. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) , Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) , Midrigan (2010) ) and findings so far provide a mixed picture of the descriptive accuracy of simple Ss state dependent predictions. On the one hand price adjustments tend to be bimodal and responsive to shocks as state dependent models predict. On the other, adjustments are not tightly clustered around modal adjustment points, with many changes too small or large to fit the stark predictions of the basic Ss model. Field data instead resembles a hybrid of state dependent adjustment of the sort described by Ss models and the sort of time dependent adjustment described by the famous Calvo (1983) rule.
We report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to not only help interpret findings from this active branch of the empirical literature but also to dig deeper into the fundamental relationship between behavior and Ss theory than has been possible using naturally occurring data.
In our experiment subjects repeatedly make adjustment decisions in a precise implementation of a standard menu cost pricing problem (Stokey (2008) ). By controlling the parameters and form of the experimental task, we can directly evaluate Ss models and significantly narrow down the set of available explanations for observed deviations from their predictions.
Price adjustments in our data are highly bimodal and diffuse, strongly resembling patterns documented in the field; we are able to "grow" data in the lab with the distinctive characteristics of naturally occurring data. Because we know the precise optima of the laboratory task ex ante, we can go further, testing for the first time whether average switching points below and above optimal prices are biased relative to Ss threshold predictions. We show that in fact adjustments are almost exactly equal to optimal Ss thresholds on average and almost perfectly obey comparative static predictions: exogenously increasing volatility across treatments widens the range of average adjustments below and above the optimum to almost exactly the degree prescribed by Ss models.
Though it is clear that Ss-like forces powerfully shape average outcomes, it is equally clear that subjects do not use stable threshold rules and do not establish true inaction regions. Indeed, subjects make numerous and often sizable errors, frequently adjusting far from average (and optimal) adjustment points. As in the field, this pattern suggests that decision rules are not tightly tied to the current state, contra Ss models. Unlike in the field, the set of explanations capable of accounting for this "time dependence" is quite small in the lab.
One avenue pursued in the literature for explaining these patterns in the field is to replace the setup of simple Ss models with more elaborate "second generation" models. However, our results suggest that such elaborations may not be necessary: strong evidence of time dependence emerges in our experiment even though we know subjects are acting in a simple, first generation Ss environment. An alternative, recently pursued in the literature (Woodford (2008) , Costain and Nakov (2011a), Costain and Nakov (2011b), Alvarez et al. (2011)), is to posit that agents experience cognitive or attention costs that can also generate time dependent patterns of adjustment. Such bounded rationality explanations seem to be the only remaining explanation for time dependence emerging in the sterile, controlled setting of our experiment. Though our results cannot, of course, rule out that second generation Ss models apply in some field environments, they do suggest that cognitive costs are very real and are at least a plausible contributing factor to time dependent patterns of adjustment documented in the world.
Using laboratory data, we can generate particularly credible structural estimates of these cognitive costs and explore how they are influenced by the environment. Our estimates suggest that the costs of exercising perfect state dependence are, on average, large relative to the standard forces in the model (3 times larger than nominal switching costs in the baseline treatment) and evident in most subjects in our sample. More importantly, our results suggest that costs are fundamentally shaped by the economic environment. We find that estimated cognitive costs are over 50% larger in high volatility than in low volatility environments. In our view, this effect of volatility is intuitive: volatility substantially increases the complexity of the optimization task (and demands more attention of the observer), making it considerably more costly to implement a threshold rule. The effect of volatility is also quite stable: estimated cognitive costs in our two high volatility treatments are statistically indistinguishable even though the two treatments generate very different Ss predictions. Finally, this volatility effect resembles volatility effects measured in recent field work by Bloom et al. (2007) on investment in Ss environments, though our laboratory setting allows us to refine the interpretation of these effects.
Though caution must be taken in projecting results from stylized laboratory experiments onto the field, there are several reasons to suspect our main results are useful for interpreting naturally occurring behavior. First, by the time they enter our analysis, our subjects have a great deal of experience with the decision making environment 24 and have developed considerable sophistication, narrowing the gap between our undergraduate subject pool and decision makers in field environments. Indeed, such sophistication is evident in the strong organizing power of theoretical predictions on average behavior. Second, the deviations from theoretical predictions we do observe -time dependent diffusion of adjustment points -are very similar to those observed in naturally occurring data. This match between field and experiment suggests that we are likely measuring phenomena that are not artifacts of the lab. Finally, our ability to crisply interpret these deviations is uniquely enabled by our laboratory environment: precise information on parameters and structure in the decision making environment are generally unobservable in the field. Though laboratory experiments are unlikely to (and shouldn't) supplant traditional empirics, observability of key variables makes laboratory evidence a powerful complement to the ongoing conversation between theory and empirics in this literature.
Still, it is important to bear in mind that the magnitudes of cognitive costs faced by subjects in our experiment are likely to be different from those experienced by the average decision maker in the field. After all, our experiment was designed to minimize the costs of making optimal choices: we do not require subjects to calculate optimal price ratios or current values of the price index and all information is neatly presented to subjects using a highly intuitive graphical interface.
That we observe strong evidence of bounded rationality even here is striking. In the field, the problem of choosing optimal adjustment times is likely orders of magnitude more difficult, as agents must gather and interpret noisy information from multiple sources and estimate optimal prices themselves. As a result, our estimates probably substantially understate cognitive costs most decision makers actually face. On the other hand, incentives to optimize are also considerably larger for decision makers in the field, counterbalancing this cost difference to a great degree. Unless cognitive costs and optimization incentives scale identically in the move from lab to field, the degree of time dependence generated by bounded rationality may be larger (or smaller) than that observed in our experiment. However, to the degree bounded rationality is a key driver of time dependence in the field (as it certainly is in the lab), the considerable time dependence documented in recent work suggests that cognitive costs are probably large relative to incentives as in the lab.
Though the precise magnitudes of our cognitive cost estimates cannot be readily exported to the field, the economic forces shaping them likely can. Perhaps our most empirically relevant result is that state dependence itself is severely and consistently eroded by volatility, a result driven by sharply increasing costs of optimizing in more complex environments. This finding suggests that caution should be taken in interpreting cognitive costs (and perhaps other behavioral measures) as structural parameters, independent of exogenous features of the economic environment.
Counterfactual exercises projecting estimates from low volatility environments into high volatility environments are likely to yield misleading policy advice.
The idea that optimization itself can be strengthened or weakened by fundamentals of an economy has potentially important implications for the interpretation of theory in a variety of policy settings. The effectiveness of monetary policy, for instance, depends critically on the degree to which firms price according to state dependent rules: though a literature starting with Caplin and Spulber (1987) suggests that monetary policy will be largely ineffective under state dependent adjustment rules, it can be highly effective under Calvo (1983) type time dependent rules. 25
While much of the empirical research on price adjustment, motivated by this policy concern, has investigated whether firms follow state dependent rules, our study suggests this may not be quite the right question: a better question might be 'when do people follow state dependent rules?' Treatment-driven comparative statics results suggest that in exceptionally high volatility environments agents may be largely time dependent while in very low volatility environments they may be largely state dependent. Monetary policy may therefore be more effective in the shadow of deep economic or policy uncertainty for the simple reason that the complexity of such environments 25 In time dependent models such as Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) monetary shocks are persistent as firms take longer to adjust while in state dependent models monetary shocks have a significantly attenuated role. Caplin and Spulber (1987) construct an example where nominal shocks to the economy do not create disturbances to aggregate output despite the fact that individual firms only respond sporadically to shocks. Danziger (1999) extends this result to show that the stark neutrality can hold when there are both firm level and aggregate productivity shocks. While both of these theoretical results are special cases with reduced form solutions, Golosov and Lucas (2007) extend the model to be consistent with the observed frequency of firm level price adjustments and find that the real effects of price disturbances are small. Caballero and Engel (2007) provide a general model to compare the results from the Ss literature with time dependent models and find that variation in the "extensive margin" of which firms adjust in response to shocks is the important feature that reduces the effect of shocks from the purely time dependent model of Calvo (1983) . The consumer's problem is:
Let P be the aggregate price index, defined by P Q ≡ j∈Ω p(j)q(j)dj. The optimal solution to the consumer's problem yields demands for each variety:
e where e ≡ E P is the expenditure in real terms, taken as given (following Stokey 2008) . The aggregate price index can then be expressed as:
We focus on the problem of a single firm and thus drop the firm index j and treat P as exogenous.
We normalize e = 1.
Time is continuous and P (t) by assumption follows a geometric Brownian motion with infinites-imal parameters µ and σ:
where w(t) is a Wiener process. We assume the firm has a constant marginal cost c, in real terms.
The firm's instantaneous profits in real terms are then given by:
Substituting the demand function, it is possible to rewrite the firm's real profits as:
Then we use the firm's relative price, z(t) ≡ p(t) P (t) and rewrite real profits with a change of variable as follows:
The value of the firm in the frictionless problem is given by:
We assume that when the firm adjusts its price it must pay a menu cost of m. The problem of the firm is then to choose the optimal stopping times {T i } and relative prices {z * i } that maximize its value:
Between adjustments, the relative price z(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion. Using the process for P (t) and applying Ito's lemma it is possible to obtain the following:
The optimal policy is characterized by an inaction region (z,z) and a return point z * such that if z(t) does not belong to (z,z) then the firm adjusts to z * and otherwise does not adjust. This implies that outside the inaction region the value function must satisfy:
Inside the inaction region the value function can be characterized in the following way. Over a small time interval ∆t, the following approximation holds:
Taking the limit ∆t → 0 gives:
Using Ito's lemma it is possible to evaluate the expectation term:
This leads to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this problem is a second order differential equation with variable coefficients. First I obtain the general solution of the associated homogeneous equation:
A particular solution of the homogeneous equation has the form f i (z) = z R i . Substituting this guess in the equation and solving for R i gives:
Then, in order to find a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we use the variation of parameters method. A solution has the form:
The functions A 1 (z) and A 2 (z) are given by:
where B 1 and B 2 are constants of integration and W (z) is the Wronskian:
A.2 Payoff Hills
Here we plot the payoff hill for each treatment parametrization. The payoff hill plots the value of the policy that uses a pair of thresholds (z;z) (not necessarily the optimal one) for adjusting, evaluated at the starting point z * . For every pair (z;z) this value function is computed fixing z * to its optimal level and using the value matching conditions to determine the two constants, B 1 and B 2 . 
A.3 Solution to the discretized problem
In this appendix we check that the solution to the continuous time model is a good approximation of the optimal rule in the discretized model that subjects actually face in the lab. The discretized problem is characterized by the following Bellman equation:
where π(z) = z −θ (z − c) and the approximations described in section 3.1 apply. We solve this
Bellman equation numerically using a spline approximation of the value function. Figure 8 plots the value function in the three parametric settings we used in the lab. In each subplot, the two red continuous lines mark the adjustment thresholds (z;z) of the continuous time model. The dotted red line marks z * . The value function of the discrete model, V (z), has a maximum at z * .
Thresholds in the discrete model are located at the points where the curve becomes flat, i.e. where
The adjustment thresholds are virtually identical to the ones obtained from the continuous time model, as can be seen from visual inspection.
A.4 Derivation of HJB equation (9)
In this appendix we provide a derivation of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation 9. Consider a small time interval ∆t. At each point in time, the value of the firm when the relative price is z, v(z), is given by the flow profit π(z) accruing over the time interval ∆t and the discounted expected value in the next state. Future payoffs are discounted at rate 1 1+r∆t . Within this time interval the agent adjusts with probability λ∆t. If an adjustment occurs by the end of the time interval the agent gets the value at the return point net of the menu cost, [v(z * ) − m]. With probability 1−λ∆t the adjustment does not occur and the agent gets v(z ). When setting the adjustment probability, over the time interval ∆t the agent incurs a cost proportional to the Kullback-Leibler divergence D KL (λ,λ) wih marginal cost of attention given by κ. Then the agent's value can be written as:
Taking the limit ∆t → 0 gives: 
where the reduction in relative entropy is given by:
The optimal choice of the adjustment probability is given by:
Substituting the optimized values in (30) gives the following Bellman equation:
B Instructions to Subjects Instructions
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The National Science Foundation and other agencies have provided the funding for this project. If you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment.
Your computer screen will display useful information. Remember that the information on your computer screen is PRIVATE. To insure best results for yourself and accurate data for the experimenters, please DO NOT COMMUNICATE with the other participants at any point during the experiment. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come.
In the experiment you will make decisions over several periods.
At the end of the last period, you will be paid $5.00, plus earnings based on your profits in a randomly selected period.
The Basic Idea.
You are in control of a company that sells its product at a Current Price. Your job is to decide when and how often to adjust the Current Price. Market conditions are constantly changing and so the Ideal Price -the price at which your current profit would be maximized -is constantly changing. Each period of the experiment is a series of many ticks (5 ticks elapse each second).
The relationship between your Current Price and the Ideal Price determines how much you earn each tick.
The further your Current Price is away from the Ideal Price (either too high or too low), the less money you make during the tick. If your Current Price is especially far from the Ideal Price you may even lose earnings during the tick. At any moment (and as often as you like) you will be allowed to pay a fixed cost, C (written on the white board), to move your Current Price to the Ideal Price. At that point the Ideal Price will continue to fluctuate just as before, possibly moving away from the Current Price again.
Screen Information.
The screen is divided into three panels as shown in Figure 9 . 
Periods and Earnings.
The experiment will be divided into a number of periods. The length of a period (in ticks) will be random -you will never know how long a period will last or when it is about to end (details below). When a period ends, a red vertical line will show up on the screen and a new period will begin. At the beginning of a new period, the Current Price will automatically be realigned with the Ideal Price and your Total Profits will be reset to zero.
At the end of the experiment we will pay you for your Total Profits realized in one randomly selected period. This number will be converted to a payment amount according to the formula shown on the white board.
Details.
Here are a few more details on the experiment, in case you want to know:
Here are some details on how the Ideal Price unfolds:
• Each phase is a series of many "ticks" (5 ticks per second).
• Each tick the Ideal Price moves randomly up or down by a fixed percentage, e.g., 2%.
• Upticks are as likely as downticks, e.g., each tick is up with probability 50% or down with probability 50%.
• The period ends with a small probability each tick, e.g., 1 2 of 1%.
• The Current Price and the Ideal Price will always be identical at the beginning of each period.
• The actual values (for ticks per second, tick size, uptick probability, and period ending probability) will be written on the board before the experiment begins.
Here are a few details on how the relationship between Current Price and the Ideal Price determines your earnings in each tick:
• Earnings are highest when your Current Price is equal to the Ideal Price and drop the further they are away from one another. To be more specific, all that actually matters is the ratio between the Current Price and the Ideal Price. If this ratio drops below 1 or rises above money you will earn less than maximum earnings.
• For instance, you will get the same earnings when your Current Price is equal to 400 and the Ideal Price is equal to 500 as when the Current Price is equal to 800 and the Ideal Price is equal to 1000.
• The exact function that describes the relation between earnings in one tick, the Current Price and the Ideal Price is plotted in Figure 10 . However you will get a good feel for this relationship from your screen over time. Frequently Asked Questions Q1. Is this some kind of psychology experiment with an agenda you haven't told us?
Answer: No. It is an economics experiment. If we do anything deceptive, or don't pay you cash as described, then you can complain to the campus Human Subjects Committee and we will be in serious trouble. These instructions are meant to clarify how you earn money, and our interest is in seeing how people make investment timing decisions.
Q2. How long does a phase last? Is there a minimum or maximum?
Answer: The length of time is random. In the example, the probability is 0.005 that any tick is the last, and there are 5 ticks per second. In this case, the average length of a round is 200 ticks or 40 seconds. Many rounds will last less than the average, and a few will last much longer. Rounds longer than 7 minutes are so unlikely that you probably will never see one.
The minimum length is one tick, but it is unlikely you will ever see a round quite that short! Q3. How many rounds will there be?
Answer: Lots. We aren't supposed to say the exact number.
Q4. Are there patterns in upticks and downticks?
Answer: No. We've tried very hard to make it random. No matter what the recent history of upticks and downticks, the probability that the next tick is up is always the same (and is written on the board).
